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THE POLITICAL MARKET FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Rachel E. Barkow* 
In 2004, the number of individuals incarcerated in the United States ex­
ceeded the two million mark.' The current incarceration rate in the United 
States is 726 �er 100,000 residents,2 the highest incarceration rate in the 
Western world and a dramatic increase from just three decades ago.
4 
Not 
only are more people serving time, but sentences have markedly length­
ened.
5 
W hat should we make of these trends? The answer has been easy for 
most legal scholars: to them, the incarceration rate in the United States is 
too high, and reforms are necessary to lower sentences. But many political 
leaders and voters reach the opposite conclusion: current sentencing levels 
are just right or, in some cases, not tough enough. 
One way to assess these competing claims would be to agree on the pur­
pose criminal punishment is supposed to serve and then to conduct an 
* 
Associate Professor, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1993, Northwestern; J .D. 
1996, Harvard. -Ed. I thank Leslie Dubeck for superb research assistance. 
I. At midyear 2004, there were 2, 131, 180 people incarcerated in prisons and jails in the 
United States. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
pjim04.pdf. 
2. Id. at 2. 
3. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN POPULATION 
CONTINUES 1 (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf. For country 
incarceration rates, see Roy WALMSLEY, HOME OFFICE (U.K.), WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 
(3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/r166.pdf. The United States 
might have the highest incarceration rate in the entire world, but because reliable figures from China 
are hard to come by, that is uncertain. 
4. In 1985, there were 313 persons held in prisons and jails per 100,000 people in the popu­
lation. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 
AT MIDYEAR 1997, at 2 tbl.7 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/pjim97.txt. 
5. For example, among federal prisoners, the 
[t]ime expected to be served, on average, increased from 26.9 months for offenders admitted 
during 1988 to 44.4 months for offenders admitted during 2000. For drug offenses, the amount 
of time an incoming offender could expect to serve increased from 39 .3 months to 61.6 
months; for weapon offenses, expected time served increased from 32.4 months to 69.6 
months. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 0EP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 
2000: WITH TRENDS 1982-2000 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
fccpOO.pdf. From 1993 to 1999, the average time served by state prisoners increased from forty-six 
months to fifty-three months (an increase of 16 percent over six years). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS­
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 510 tbl.6.43 
(2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t643.pdf. 
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empirical evaluation of how well current incarceration policies achieve that 
purpose. The difficulty with this approach is readily apparent. To begin, the 
purpose of punishment is highly contested. The purpose could be deter­
rence, incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, or some combination 
thereof, and neither voters nor scholars agree on the proper metric. If that 
alone were not a sufficient hurdle, there is also the thorny question of meas­
uring effectiveness. Given the complexity of human behavior and social 
dynamics, it is not easy to assess whether a particular sentence will deter or 
rehabilitate offenders or whether it will cause a reduction in crime rates. 
An alternative method for evaluating sentencing and incarceration poli­
cies is to analyze the institutional dynamics that produce them. If the 
political economy that produces sentencing laws suffers from an imbalance 
or defect of some kind, that could provide a reason for questioning the sen­
tencing policy itself. 6 
The political-economy approach is the one that Doran Teichman takes in 
his recent article The Market for Criminal Justice,7 and his piece shows the 
promise of this method in assessing questions of criminal justice policy. As 
Teichman points out, looking at criminal justice policy from this institu­
tional perspective might reveal counterintuitive conclusions and shed new 
light on important questions in criminal law, such as how to divide authority 
among local, state, and federal jurisdictions and how to assess substantive 
laws and sentences. This methodology is a welcome addition to the scholar­
ship on the federalization of crime, and it will undoubtedly produce many 
valuable insights. Teichman's inquiry is a prime example, for it demon­
strates that there is, theoretically at least, a category of crimes for which 
state competition might produce a race toward more severe sentences than 
would be produced by a single central authority. 
But Teichman's article also serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers 
of taking an institutional approach without careful attention to the facts on 
the ground. An evaluation of the political economy requires as much atten­
tion to the political as it does to the economy, particularly before drawing 
conclusions about how to allocate jurisdiction over crime policy between 
state and federal authorities. At a minimum, one must carefully consider and 
compare the politics of sentencing at both the state and federal levels before 
making a claim that either has an advantage over the other. Teichman's arti­
cle, however, considers only the incentives of state actors-and only some 
of the incentives at that-and it is through that narrow lens that he reaches 
"the conclusion that, contrary to the commonly held view among legal 
6. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1276 (2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Federalism] (using this methodology in comparing the political 
processes of the states and the federal government in setting sentencing policy); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 746-54 (2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering 
Crime] (explaining that a factor in the movement toward insulated sentencing commissions was a 
worry that the political process would not produce rational sentencing policy). 
7. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and 
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831 (2005). 
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scholars, additional federal regulation in the area of criminal justice might 
be desirable to limit the inefficient harshening of that system caused by ju­
risdictional competition."8 
In this Essay, I will expand on Teichman's analysis to show that, while 
his article offers an illuminating insight into the relationship among states 
and should serve as a springboard for further research on the proper alloca­
tion between state and federal authorities, his argument is incomplete: it 
ignores political incentives at the state level that do not involve mobile 
criminals and fails to consider the political economy of crime and sentenc­
ing at the federal level. These additional factors undermine the strength of 
Teichman's posited link between state competition and the rise in harsher 
sentences and call into question his argument for greater federal involve­
ment. Indeed, while Teichman is right that criminal law scholars should pay 
more attention to institutional dynamics, the political-economy perspective 
suggests that those seeking to curtail the trend toward harsh sentences 
should seek to limit, not expand, federal involvement over crime. Teichman 
reaches a contrary conclusion only by assuming a central authority that is 
divorced from political pressure-an assumption that hardly describes Con­
gress or the federal executive branch. 
I. TH E TENUOUS LINK BETWEEN STATE COMPETITION 
AND LONGER SENTENCES 
One of Teichman 's central insights is that jurisdictional competition may 
create incentives for states to raise sentences under some circumstances in 
order to shift criminal activity to neighboring jurisdictions. Teichman posits 
that this creates an "arms race"9 that is partially responsible for the harshen­
ing of sentences in recent years.10 
While Teichman is likely correct on his narrow claim-that state compe­
tition might be responsible for some increases in sentences-it is important 
to emphasize just how small this category of sentences is likely to be and 
how tenuous its relationship is to the incarceration boom and the trend to­
ward longer sentences. As Teichman himself admits, jurisdictional 
competition will occur only under limited circumstances because "some 
crimes are clearly local,"11 and the mobility of criminals is often hindered 
because of costs.12 Indeed, Teichman concedes that only a handful of crimes 
have produced concrete examples of displacement, and those crimes are 
8. Id. at 1835. 
9. Id. at 1834, 1839-40. 
10. Id. at 1835 (referring to the "inefficient harshening of [the criminal justice] system 
caused by jurisdictional competition") (emphasis added). 
11. Id. at 1841; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & 
PoL'Y REV. 53, 85 (2003) (noting that "crime is not geographically fungible" and observing that, 
even when jurisdictions use geographically targeted policing, the displacement effect is limited). 
12. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1842. 
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driven by profit motives. 13 Moreover, even in those limited instances, the 
magnitude of a displacement effect has been "relatively small."14 Neverthe­
less, relatively small does not necessarily mean relatively unimportant. 
Teichman's article is therefore at its most valuable in alerting readers to the 
potential for states to set sentences for some crimes with displacement in 
mind. 
The problem, however, is that Teichman often goes beyond his own 
stated boundaries for when displacement-and thus a race-is likely to oc­
cur, and that leads him to assume that jurisdictional competition is 
responsible for sentencing increases in areas where a race is unlikely to be 
the cause. A prime example of this is his claim that three-strikes laws might 
be an outgrowth of state competition.15 As an initial matter, the sweep of 
three-strikes laws belies the claim that they are concerned with mobile 
crimes and criminals. Three-strikes laws do not cover only those crimes 
driven by profit motives; indeed, they cover a wide range of violent and 
nonviolent crimes.16 Most violent crimes are impulsive and insensitive to 
variation among jurisdictions, as Teichman admits, and many nonviolent 
offenses are similarly local in nature.17 There is no reason to believe that 
most crimes covered by three-strikes laws are "sensitive to the potential 
13. Id. at 1840-41 (citing burglary, robbery, narcotics production and sales, and prostitution). 
Of course, even with crimes that are predominantly profit-driven, the displacement story should not 
be overstated. Individuals engaged in crime for profit often are committing crime to support a drug 
habit. For instance, in 1996, one in four (25.6 percent) convicted property offenders serving time in 
jail committed the offense to get money for drugs. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS­
TICE, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES 1996 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/pji96.pdf. Offenders are often under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of their profit­
driven offense. For example, among state prisoners serving time for a property offense in 1997, 53.2 
percent reported being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense. Among 
federal prisoners serving time for a property offense in 1997, 22.6 percent reported being under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense. Grouping all crime categories together, 51 
percent of prisoners (52 percent of state and 34 percent of federal prisoners) reported being under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of their offense. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997 (1999), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/satsfp97 .pdf. Consequently, these offenders are 
not necessarily thinking rationally before they act, so they might not be sensitive to jurisdictional 
differences in sentencing. 
14. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1842; see also David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic 
Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 474 n.56 
(1997) ("Much research shows that displacement is seldom total and often inconsequential."). 
15. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1847-48 ("[S]ome criminals will find it beneficial to relocate 
their activity from states that adopted three-strikes Jaws to those that did not."). 
16. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8.5 (2004) (imposing enhancements for third seri­
ous felon and defining a serious felony to include murder, rape, dealing in cocaine, and burglary 
with a deadly weapon, id. § 35-50-2-2(b)(4)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (2002) (allowing for 
twenty-five-year discretionary enhancement for any third felony conviction); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-11-18 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing for a life sentence for any third felony conviction punish­
able by confinement in a penitentiary); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 48 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the breadth of California's three-strikes law, which is triggered by a wide 
range of conduct). 
17. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1841 n.55 (citing authority for the proposition that "crimes of 
passion tend not to be displaced"). 
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costs and benefits of relocating," undermining the claim that jurisdictional 
competition was the motivating factor behind the laws.18 Teichman's use of 
sex offender registration and notification laws suffers from a similar short­
coming. Sex offenses are rarely crimes motivated by profit, and Teichman's 
sparse anecdotal evidence fails to demonstrate that most or even many sex 
offenders are responsive to these laws and therefore leave jurisdictions to 
avoid them.19 His invocation of laws imposing collateral consequences on 
convicted offenses,20 such as the removal of some occupational licenses, 
falls short for the same reasons. These laws typically cover all types of fel­
ons-including those who commit impulsive crimes and who do not have 
much mobility.21 
The federal government's adoption of these same laws further under­
mines the claim that jurisdictional competition motivated three-strikes 
sentencing provisions, sex-offender notice and registration laws, or laws 
imposing collateral punishments on convicted felons. If three-strikes laws 
result from a desire to push offenders to neighboring jurisdictions, why 
would the federal government pass similar legislation?22 If sex-offender reg­
istration laws spring from interstate competition and lead to a race to ever­
harsher requirements, what explains the fact that Congress passed one of the 
toughest such laws in the country and reduces federal law enforcement 
funding to any state that fails to enact legislation with certain notification 
and registration requirements?23 If there is a race, why would the federal 
18. Id. at 1842. Teichman's anecdotal evidence-which consists of hearsay, political postur­
ing, and some stray quotes by state officials-is weak evidence to the contrary and offers no insights 
on how many individuals covered by these laws are likely to respond to them by relocating. Id. at 
1847-48. 
19. Again, Teichman's evidence consists of a few quotes and isolated incidents published in 
newspaper accounts. Id. at 1854-55 nn. 131-32. 
20. Id. at 1853. 
21. See, e.g., SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED 
FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/ 
forms/state_survey.pdf (listing several states that allow revocation of professional licenses as a result 
of any felony conviction). 
22. See, e.g., Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000) (imposing 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for individuals charged under § 922(g) with three prior 
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce­
ment Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2000) (mandating life imprisonment for defendants with 
two prior violent felonies or more serious drug offenses); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools 
To End the E xploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 
650 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.S. § 3559(e) (LexisNexis 2005)) (two-strikes law 
imposing life imprisonment for child sex offenders). 
23. See Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000) (punishing a state whose sentences for 
violent crimes are less than the national average or whose laws do not require offenders to serve at 
least 85 percent of their sentences by reducing the federal law enforcement assistance funds it re­
ceives if offenders sentenced in that state go on to commit certain offenses in other states); Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071 (2000) (imposing a 10 percent reduction of assistance grant funds on noncompliant states); 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c) (2000) (requiring federal authorities to notify state authorities when a 
federal sex offender is released or sentenced to probation); Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking 
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government need to set a floor? And if laws imposing collateral conse­
quences for felons were responsive to displacement, why did the federal 
government lead the way in enacting so many such lawsi4 
The answer to these questions seems obvious: these laws are not the by­
product of jurisdictional competition but of political pressure within a 
jurisdiction. Thus, while there is a political-economy story to tell about sen­
tencing laws, it is not the one that Teichman advances. Voters and powerful 
interest groups demand these laws, regardless of what neighboring jurisdic­
tions are doing, and almost no influential interests stand in the way.25 Three­
strikes laws, like other recidivist laws, respond to voter demands for tougher 
sentences that the public believes will incapacitate offenders and deter them 
from striking again or will make them pay even further for their crimes. 26 
Prosecutors and those with an interest in the expansion of prisons also sup­
port these laws, as do organizations such as the National Rifle Association 
and victims' rights groups.27 Sex-offender notification and registration laws 
likewise provide politicians with an opportunity to appear responsive to vot­
ers' concerns about crime without losing the support of any important 
constituency. These laws are as much about symbolism as they are about 
any utilitarian goal, much less one that involves jurisdictional competition. 
The same is true of collateral consequences. They express a social judgment 
that those convicted of crimes are not entitled to the same benefits as every­
one else, and they enable politicians to look proactive on crime without 
much real effort. While Teichman recognizes that "( v ]alues such as retribu­
tion and fairness obviously play a significant role in shaping criminal 
sanctions,"28 he sees these values acting as checks on, rather than instigators 
of, the push for harsher sentences. But, in fact, the political climate today is 
characterized by sentiment for tougher laws in the name of retribution and . 
d 29 JUSt eserts. 
and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2003) (requiring registered sex offenders to 
notify the FBI when moving to a new state). 
24. See OFFI CE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES 
IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (showing the breadth of collateral 
consequences imposed by the federal government); Teichman, supra note 7, at 1853 n.120 ("[M)any 
of the collateral consequences of criminal convictions were initiated by the federal government 
. . . . "). 
25. For a more detailed discussion of the politics of sentencing, see Barkow, Administering 
Crime, supra note 6, at 721-30. For an insightful discussion of the politics of criminal law, see 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). 
26. Indeed, Teichman's claim that legislatures passed these laws with the intent to prevent 
offender migration is undermined by his own anecdotal evidence. He cites a California Department 
of Justice study that found that the California law had the "unintended" consequence of prompting 
parolees to leave the state. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1847 (emphasis added). 
27. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 6, at 729. 
28. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1863. 
29. See Barkow, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1278-79 & n.2; see also Gerard E. Lynch, 
Sentencing: Learning from, and Worrying About, the States, 105 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 933, 933 (2005) 
("The late twentieth century saw wholesale changes in sentencing philosophy and practice. The 
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These intrajurisdictional dynamics of voter and interest-group prefer­
ences explain why the federal government's sanctions in the areas Teichman 
explores are harsher than the respective state laws. If these laws were the 
outgrowth of jurisdictional competition, one would expect federal sanctions 
to be lower than state sanctions for similar crimes.Jo These political pres­
sures within a jurisdiction also explain why punishments have grown 
harsher across the board and not just in those areas where scholars have 
found evidence of displacement.J' Further, it accounts for the fact that, while 
the potential for state competition has existed since the formation of the Un­
ion, it is only in recent decades that we have seen the massive push toward 
incarceration and dramatic sentence increases. The constant of state compe­
tition cannot explain the variability of sentencing patterns. But the changing 
political and cultural climate within the United States as a whole does ac­
count for the recent shift. 
conventional wisdom about the primary purpose of sentencing shifted away from rehabilitation as a 
.dominant philosophy and toward retribution or 'just deserts.'"). 
30. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1843 n.60. Teichman posits in a footnote that perhaps the 
federal sanctions are not really similar because the federal government is prosecuting more serious 
versions of the same crime. Id. Yet the composition of federal prisoners as compared to state prison­
ers belies that assertion. For instance, in 2000, only IO percent of federal inmates were incarcerated 
for violent offenses, compared with 49 percent of state inmates. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
crimoff.htm#inmates (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). Moreover, the trend in state prisons has been to 
house more violent offenders, while the trend in federal prison is to house more drug offenders. See 
id. ("Violent offenders accounted for 53% of the growth in State prisons between 1990 to 2000, 
drug offenders accounted for 59% of the growth in Federal prisons."). And while Teichman is cor­
rect that the federal government is not responsible as the primary regulator so it "can afford to 
impose the severe sanctions it chooses to impose," Teichman, supra note 7, at 1843 n.60, that does 
not explain why the federal government would choose to spend its funds on more severe sanctions 
instead of something else. 
31. It is not just auto theft or even drug sentences that have grown longer; rather sentences 
for everything from domestic violence to murder to rape have increased. For example, the mean 
time served for murder increased from 92 to 106 months from 1990 to 1999, and time served for 
rape increased from 62 to 79 months over the same period. By comparison, time served for motor 
vehicle theft increased from twenty to twenty-five months, and time served for fraud increased from 
twenty to twenty-three months in that same time span. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 506 tt.637-38 (2005), avail­
able at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t637.pdf, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/ 
t638.pdf; see also Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychologi­
cal and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 24 n.5 (1997) ("[M]ean sentence lengths across all offenses nearly doubled be­
tween 1984 and 1990 . . . .  " (citing 2 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IM­
PACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PRoSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
AND PLEA BARGAINING 378-81 (1991))). Because sentences have increased across all crimes, the 
fact that sex-offender registration and notification laws have also grown more strict does not "vali­
date[] the jurisdictional competition hypothesis," as Teichman claims. Teichman, supra note 7, at 
1856. One would expect increasing severity because of the political economies within a jurisdiction, 
regardless of what neighboring states are doing. That explains why the federal government has 
consistently increased the punishment, notification, and registration requirement for sex offenders. 
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C.S. § 3559(e) (LexisNexis 2005)); supra note 23. 
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All this is not to say that displacement does not occur in limited circum­
stances or that displacement might not play a minor role in producing some 
sentencing increases. There might be examples where crime-location deci­
sions are made on the basis of jurisdictional differences in sentences, and 
states may then respond accordingly. But this is going to be the exception, not 
the rule, in terms of explaining the broader trend of ever-longer sentences in 
recent decades. 
II. A CURE WORSE T HAN THE DISEASE: FEDERAL AUTHORITY 
OVER SENTENCING 
Although jurisdictional competition is unlikely to be a major factor in 
most state sentencing decisions, there will likely be limited areas where ei­
ther real or perceived displacement plays a role in state decisions to alter 
sentencing policy. This can lead to a race to the top, in which state competi­
tion leads to innovations and better decisionmaking, or a race to the bottom, 
in which states overspend on criminal-justice resources and produce sen­
tences that are harsher than necessary.32 Even if one could marshal sufficient 
evidence that states are responding to other states in setting sentences, it 
would be difficult to identify whether the race is to the top or to the bottom 
and whether it produces sentences that are too harsh.33 But assuming that 
one could identify a situation in which state sentences were "too harsh" be­
cause of displacement concerns, the next question is what to do about it.34 
More specifically, would a race to the bottom justify federal legislative in­
tervention, as Teichman suggests? 
When thinking about how to allocate authority over criminal-justice 
matters between state and federal jurisdictions, it is important to assess the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of each. To the extent that a race among 
states leads to inefficiently high sentences for some limited category of 
crimes, that is a downside to state jurisdiction that should be factored into 
the comparative analysis. But it is only one factor. It does not necessarily 
follow that federal authority is a more attractive alternative because the fed­
eral political process might have shortcomings of its own that are as bad as 
or worse than the harms that might follow from jurisdictional competition. 
Indeed, characteristics of the federal political process make it quite 
likely that any intervention by Congress will yield results that are as harsh 
as or harsher than state sentences. The federal government faces largely the 
same interest group and voter pressures to appear tough on crime that the 
32. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1859-64. 
33. Teichman suggests that the race to the bottom is characterized by putting too many re­
sources into punishment. Id. at 1861. But this assumes that utilitarian goals are the only ones 
motivating a state. S tates may prefer higher levels of punishment than a utilitarian calculus would 
yield because of the retributive or expressive value of a harsher sentence. 
34. Wayne Logan provides an illuminating analysis of Teichman's other solution, interstate 
cooperation. See Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1733 (2006). 
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states face. Moreover, unlike at the state level, there are fewer political 
forces pushing in the opposite direction at the federal level. Groups repre­
senting the interests of defendants are politically weak at all levels of 
government, but it is more likely that advocates making arguments for 
shorter sentences on the basis of cost concerns will have more sway at the 
state level. States are more sensitive to sentencing costs because they make 
up a larger portion of state budgets than they do of the federal budget and 
because states cannot carry deficits to pay for their crime policies. 35 As a 
result, state actors tend to see the budget in zero-sum terms, and crime ex­
penditures are viewed with greater scrutiny because money saved on 
incarceration costs could be spent elsewhere. 
In addition, because the states are responsible for the entire range of 
criminal conduct, there will be a greater disciplining effect on states than the 
federal government, even if states are sentencing with mobile criminals in 
mind. That is, because states will likely want an internally rational state 
code-in which, for example, murder is treated more seriously than theft­
there will be a limit on how much a state will raise sentences for theft, even 
if those thefts involve mobile criminals. States will want to allocate their 
limited budgets to make the most effective use of their resources, which 
means that they are likely to reserve prison space for violent offenders. 
These concerns will act as checks on any state impulse to raise sentences 
because of displacement concerns, and they will also act as checks on other 
demands for increased sentences. And to the extent that state actors are mo­
tivated by these resource constraints and a desire for an efficient allocation 
of resources among all crimes, those state actors will face a political process 
that is more balanced than the one at the federal level. 
That is because there are currently few disciplining effects on the federal 
process that prompt a rational look at sentencing.36 The federal government 
pays little attention to the costs of sentencing because incarceration costs 
37 make up a small part of the federal budget, and the full costs of a sentenc-
ing increase do not materialize until future years as the sentences are being 
served. Because Congress does not have to produce a fiscal note before 
passing legislation, those costs often go under the radar. There is little po­
litical pressure to pay more attention to them because those competing for 
federal resources do not view the federal budget in zero-sum terms and do 
35. Barkow, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1300-03 (comparing the politics of sentencing 
costs at the state and federal levels). 
36. For an expanded discussion of the federal politics of sentencing, see id. at 1299--1312. 
37. Id. at 1301 (noting that federal spending on crime makes up just over I percent of the 
federal budget); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN­
MENT: HISTORICAL TABLES FISCAL YEAR 2006, OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION AND SUBFUNCTION: 1962-
2010 (2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/sheets/hist03z2.xls (showing 
that in fiscal year 2004, federal corrections accounted for slightly less than a mere quarter of a per­
cent of total government spending for that year). 
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not see federal crime expenditures as vulnerable targets in any event because 
they are so politically popular.38 
Moreover, because the federal government has jurisdiction over a subset 
of crime, the federal political process does not experience the disciplining 
process that comes with the responsibility of being the front-line enforcer of 
most criminal laws. Because Congress has limited jurisdiction, it does not 
need to consider how federal offenses stack up against all other crimes. It 
does not need to reserve the longest sentences for the most violent crimes, 
such as murder and rape, because those crimes are largely handled at the 
state level. The federal government therefore lacks the pressure that states 
feel to devise a code that treats all crimes as a coherent whole.39 And be­
cause limited jurisdiction means that the federal government maintains a 
smaller police force than the states, Congress may have a greater incentive 
than the states to use a strategy of increased sentences as opposed to in­
creased likelihood of detection for improving deterrence.40 
There are, then, strong incentives for federal officials to pass laws with 
longer sentences, and few factors that put pressure in the opposite direction. 
This is not just a theoretical insight. Even in the areas of alleged jurisdic­
tional competition highlighted by Teichman, we have seen that federal 
intervention often involves a similarly harsh or even more severe sentence or 
law.41 And to the extent that Congress seeks to promote uniformity among 
the states, it has passed laws that encourage the states themselves to enact 
more stringent laws.42 Congress, for instance, passed the Anti Car Theft Act 
of 1992, which provides enticements for states to pass auto-theft-prevention 
laws like the ones Teichman criticizes as examples of inefficient laws pro­
duced by jurisdictional competition.43 Similarly, Congress has passed laws 
that create incentives for states to adopt strict notice, registration, and sen-. 
tencing requirements for sex offenders.44 Thus, if the bottom to which states 
38. Barkow, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1302. 
39. This may explain why the federal code itself has ballooned so dramatically in recent 
years. Compare Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Undeifederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & 
Pua. PoL'Y 247, 251 & n.19 (1997) (estimating more than three thousand federal offenses), with 
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 514-17 (listing representative state codes as having approximately five 
hundred offenses and noting that "[f]ederal criminal law probably covers more conduct ...  than any 
state criminal code"). 
40. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 
169, 178-85 (1968). 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. 
42. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) 
(2000) (providing incentive grants for states that require violent offenders to serve at least 85 per­
cent of their sentences). 
43. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1871 ("[T]he ACTA conditions states' eligibility for federal 
grants on the creation of a state ATPA much like Michigan's."). 
44. See Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000) (exempting a state from reimbursement 
requirements for sex-offender prosecutions of its parolees in other states if it adopts certain mini­
mum sentencing terms for sex offenders); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
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are racing, according to Teichman, consists of ever-harsher sentences when 
more lenient sentences would get the job done, advocating federal legisla­
tion does not appear to be the solution. 
CONCLUSION 
Although jurisdictional competition is not a critical impetus for the sen­
tencing increases of the modem era, it should not be overlooked as an 
important dynamic. Doran Teichman therefore advances our knowledge of 
the political economy of crime by highlighting how state competition might 
operate to affect sentencing policies. More importantly, by taking a look at 
the institutions that produce sentencing policy and their incentives, 
Teichman employs a methodology that holds great promise for our under­
standing of the wisdom of substantive criminal law and sentencing. 
But a closer look at the political economy of sentencing reveals that, 
contrary to Teichman's argument, the federal government is not likely to 
provide a solution to a state race to the bottom that produces overly harsh 
sentences. That is because the current federal sentencing laws are not, as 
Teichman asserts, the product of some kind of congressional "misunder­
standing of the proper role of the federal government in designing crime­
prevention policies" that could be corrected with more education.45 Congress 
does not "misunderstand" its role when it passes these laws. Rather, it does 
not care about the extemality problem because that does not win members 
of Congress votes. While a central planner could, in theory, correct negative 
externalities of state competition-to the extent they exist-Congress is not 
a theoretical central planner. It is a political body that responds to political 
pressures. Because those pressures push for more severe sentences and there 
is currently no political mileage to be had for forging compromises that re­
quire states to set lower sentences, federal intervention will fail to provide a 
correction for state competition that leads to overly-harsh sentences. In fact, 
federal legislative intervention could exacerbate the problem, as it has in the 
many areas Teichman explores.46 
Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000) (conditioning federal funding on 
state adoption of certain minimal registration and notification requirements for sex offenders). 
45. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1871. 
46. These same criticisms do not apply to Teichman's suggestion that federal courts should 
be playing a greater role in policing sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. Teichman, supra note 
7, at 1869-70. Greater court involvement seems to address both the shortcomings of jurisdictional 
competition that worry Teichman and the one-sided dynamic that pervades the federal and state 
politics of sentencing. 
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